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UCC-USED GOODS
UCC - Application of the Mississippi Uniform
Commercial Code's Implied Warranty Provisions to Used
Goods and the Enforceability of Disclaimer Clauses-
Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981).
In the early part of 1977 Bernie Evans visited the Massey-
Ferguson dealer in Yazoo City to purchase some of the equip-
ment he would need in planting 200 acres in soybeans.' He in-
formed the salesman, John Warren, that he was just starting out
in this business. Warren offered to help select the necessary equip-
ment and to tell him all that he knew about farming. Relying on
Warren's expertise, Evans signed purchase orders and installment
contracts on the following items: a new grain drill, a used com-
bine, a water tank and trailer and a used disc harrow.' Included
in the purchase orders was Massey-Ferguson's regular warranty
for new equipment and a clause disclaiming any warranties with
regard to used equipment.'
During the negotiations prior to the sales, Warren assured
Evans that the equipment would be delivered in time for it to be
used" and that both the grain drill' and the combine6 would be
in "field ready" condition when delivered. Unfortunately, this never
came true. The grain drill was delivered several weeks late in
an unassembled state. Once assembled it failed to work properly
and several attempts to repair it were unsuccessful. 7 Similar prob-
lems were encountered when the combine was delivered several
months later. It appeared that none of the repair work which had
been promised had been done, and like the grain drill, the com-
bine was also never put in an operable condition.8
After the trouble began with the equipment, Evans discon-
tinued his payments and the Massey-Ferguson Credit Corpora-
tion repossessed it.9 Two separate actions developed from these
events. The first was brought by Massey-Ferguson Credit Cor-
poration to recover a deficiency judgment on the installment con-
1. Brief for appellee at 1, Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981).
2. 406 So. 2d at 16, 17.
3. Id. at 21.
4. Brief for Appellee at 1, Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981).
5. Id. at 10.
6. Id. 12.
7. Id. at 2, 3.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 5.
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tracts, the second by Evans against Massey-Ferguson, Inc. under
the theory of a breach of express and implied warranties." These
cases were consolidated, and the chancellor of Wilkinson Coun-
ty awarded Massey-Ferguson a deficiency judgment of $732.03
from the repossession and sale of the water tank, trailer and disc
harrow. Also, Evans was awarded a judgment of $9,989.11 in
his breach of warranty action." On appeal, the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's basic decision, but
modified the amount of damages awarded. The court held that
Massey-Ferguson had breached both express and implied war-
ranties as to the new grain drill, and had also breached an im-
plied warranty as to the used combine, despite Massey-Ferguson's
contention that any implied warranty had been disclaimed and the
equipment had been purchased "as is." A major part of the court's
decision was based upon certain sections of the Mississippi Code
Annotated (1972). 12 Almost all of the sections relied upon by the
court are included in the Mississippi version of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.1" The following analysis will examine the area of
implied warranties, the Mississippi Supreme Court's application
of those relevant sections of the U.C.C. to used products, and
the apparent unenforceability of disclaimer clauses.
BACKGROUND: A LOOK AT MississIppi LAW
In 1966 the Mississippi legislature passed a bill adopting the
U.C.C., to take effect March 31, 1968.14 The bill included sec-
tions 2-314 and 2-315 of the model U.C.C. which dealt with im-
plied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose." Section 2-316 of the U.C.C., which allows for exclu-
sion or modification of those warranties, was omitted." This omis-
sion sparked comment and criticism and led to much confusion.
In an article revised for the Mississippi Law Institute, Professor
William E. Hogan of Cornell University called the omission
"puzzling" and urged the Mississippi Bar to work to have the pro-
vision included in the Code. He interpreted the omission as allow-
10. 406 So. 2d at 16.
11. Id.
12. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981).
13. (Hereinafter referred to as U.C.C.] The Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code is codified
at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 through 75-10-104 (1972 and Supp. 1981).
14. 1966 Miss. LAWS ch. 316, § 10-101.
15. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-314 and 75-2-315 (1972).
16. 1966 Miss. LAWS ch. 316 § 10-101.
[Vol.3:135
UCC-USED GOODS
ing the same type of disclaimers as before the U.C.C.17 Another
possible interpretation is that the Mississippi legislature intended
to render all disclaimer clauses powerless. 8 In 1977 the legislature
attempted to clarify the situation it had created by amend-
ing sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the Code. These amendments
deleted language which permitted the exclusion of these warran-
ties under section 2-316 of the Model Act.19 The legislative in-
tent in making these changes is clearly expressed in the Pream-
ble to Chapter 385 of the General Laws of Mississippi, 1976,
wherein it was stated and admitted that the confusion resulting
from the deletion of section 2-316 has caused some courts to per-
mit disclaimers. Further it is stated that "it was the intent of the
Legislature by deleting section 2-316 . . .and amending section
2-314 . . .and section 2-315 ...to prohibit the exclusion or
modification of implied warranties of merchantability of fitness
for a particular purpose." 0 The 1976 amendments contained
another important change. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-719(4) (Supp.
1981) was added to the Mississippi U.C.C. This section was not
a part of the Model Act and it is significant because it disallows
any limitation of remedies available for breach of the implied war-
ranty sections.2" It is clear that all of these sections together work
to prohibit disclaimers of warranties and form the basis for the
court's holding in the present case.
As stated previously, before the 1976 amendments much con-
fusion existed concerning the state of warranty law in Mississip-
17. Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 Miss. L. INST. 41, 48-50 (1967).
18. See, e.g., Millbaugh, Coffinberger, Seller's Disclaimers of Implied Warranties: The
Legislatures Strike Back, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 160, 164 (1980); Clark and Davis "Beefing Up Product
Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer Protection," Warranties in the Sale of Goods 599
(PLI Handbook Series No. 169, 1977) (Both pointing out the two possible inferences which can
be drawn from the Mississippi Legislature's actions and criticizing the actions for the uncertainty
and confusion they have caused).
19. The pertinent parts of these sections which were effected by these amendments read as
follows: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-314(1) (amended 1976) "Unless excluded or modified, a war-
ranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is
a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." (emphasis added). Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315
(amended 1976) "Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judg-
ment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under section 75-2-317
an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purposes" (emphasis added). The words
"unless excluded or modified" were deleted by the 1976 amendments. 1976 Miss. LAWS ch. 385
§ 1.
20. 1976 Miss. LAWS ch. 385.
21. Id. The added section reads, "Any limitation of remedies which would deprive the buyer
of a remedy to which he may be entitled for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose shall be prohibited. (emphasis added). See, e.g., Montague
and Montague, Warranties Under The Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code -Rights, Remedies
and Limitation of Disclaimers 36th ANNUAL MiSsiSSiPPI LAW INSTITUTE 81 (1981).
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pi. Some were of the opinion that by deleting section 2-316 the
state was retaining a pre-U.C.C. or common law rule with regard
to warranties.22 Although this may not have been the legislature's
intent, it is important to determine what the rule was before the
U.C.C.
This discussion will involve two main issues. First, does an
implied warranty attach to the sale of a used product, such as the
combine in this case, and second, under what circumstances and
conditions may the seller exclude such a warranty.
As early as 1848 the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized
that, "There is certainly a tendency in the modern cases to enlarge
the responsibility of the seller, and to extend the doctrine of im-
plied warranty."23 The court declined to follow the movement and
held that caveat emptor was the rule to be applied in Mississippi.2
Generally, the courts have followed this rule, showing a reluc-
tance to recognize the existence of implied warranties and an
eagerness to validate disclaimer clauses used by sellers."
The advent of the automobile age in the early 1900's brought
with it a multitude of cases in the area of warranty law. The first
such Mississippi case, Mobile Auto Co. v. Sturges,26 is not typical
of those that follow since it makes no distinction as to whether
the seller was the manufacturer and whether recovery was based
upon an expressed or an implied warranty. In a very short and
confusing opinion the court allowed the plaintiff to recover on
a breach of warranty theory because of alleged defects with the
22. Hogan, supra note 17, at 47.
23. Otts v. Alderson, 18 Miss. (10 S. & M.) 476, 481 (1848).
24. Id. at 480. A suit was brought for an alleged breach of warranty of soundness with regard
to a slave. The issue in the case was whether a purchase of a slave implies a warranty of sound-
ness when the buyer paid a full price.
25. See Stribling Bros. v. The Girod Co., 239 Miss. 488, 124 So. 2d 289 (1963) (holding
that no implied warranty existed because a salesman's representations were unauthorized; also
any implied warranties were excluded by the express warranty); J. T. Fargason and Sons, Inc.
v. Cullander Machinery Co., 224 Miss. 620, 80 So. 2d 757 (1955) (no implied warranty allowed
where the seller was not also the manufacturer); Watts v. Adair, 211 Miss. 777, 53 So. 2d 649
(1951) (no implied warranty of fitness or quality where the seller is not the manufacturer); Voos
v. Lawrence, 200 Miss. 1, 26 So. 2d 172 (1946) (no implied warranty as to a used outboard
motor); Williams v. McClain, 180 Miss. 6, 176 So. 717 (1937) (no implied warranty as to a
used motor vehicle); Pritchard v. Hall, 175 Miss. 588, 167 So. 629 (1936) (no implied warranty
when there is a clause stating "in its present condition" in a contract for the sale of an automobile);
Gerard Motor Co. v. McEachern, 150 Miss. 437, 116 So. 816 (1928) (no implied warranty when
there was an opportunity to inspect); Industrial Finance Corp. v. Wheat, 142 Miss. 536, 107
So. 382 (1926) (in the sale of an automobile there is no implied warranty in the absence of fraud
or where the seller is not the manufacturer unless the seller knew the buyer was relying on his
judgment); P.D. Bellville Supply Co. v. Dacey, 141 Miss. 569, 106 So. 818 (1926) (same rule
as case before); Joslin v. Caughlin, 26 Miss. 134 (1953) (no implied warranty of soundness for
a slave). Compare with Mobile Auto Co. v. Sturges, 107 Miss. 848, 66 So. 205 (1914) (allowing
recovery based on a breach of warranty theory but gave little justification for its decision).
26. 107 Miss. 848, 66 So. 205 (1914).
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automobile.27 In 1926 the court decided P.D. Bellville Supply Co.
v. Dacey,5 another automobile case which denied recovery on
an implied warranty claim. The court held that there was no im-
plied warranty where the seller was not the manufacturer and
where the article was available for inspection, "in the absence of
fraud on the part of the seller, unless the defects therein were la-
tent, and the seller knew the buyer did not rely on his own judg-
ment but on that of the seller who knew or might have known
the existence of the defects." 9 Similar language was adopted in
subsequent cases3" including Industrial Finance Corp. v. Wheat. 31
In that case the court had an additional factor to consider because
a clause contained in the contract stated, "said vehicle is accepted
without any express or implied warranties unless expressly con-
tained herein."3 the court interpreted this to be a legitimate ex-
clusion and held that an implied warranty did not exist.3 A similar
clause was analyzed in Pritchard v. Hall34 in a suit brought by
a seller to collect on a promissory note. The court construed the
language, "in its present condition" to be a valid disclaimer clause
and held that no implied warranty was included in the contract."
One of the most cited cases in this area of Mississippi law
is Williams v. McClain." This case involved the sale of a used
hearse which had been represented as a 1933 model when in fact
it was a 1932 model. When McClain, the purchaser, com-
plained, Williams, the seller, pointed at the language in the sales
contract describing the vehicle as a "used Ford hearse as is. " 31
Williams contended that this language effectively excluded any
implied warranties as to the model of the vehicle. In ruling that
there is no implied warranty of a used motor vehicle the court
upheld the general rule in effect at that time. The court then
turned its attention to the "as is" clause. Taking into account all
the writings and negotiations between the parties, the court came
27. Id.
28. 141 Miss. 569, 106 So. 818 (1926).
29. Id. at 573, 106 So. at 819 (quoting Otts v. Alderson, 18 Miss. (10 S. & M.) 476, 481
(1848).
30. See J. T. Fargason and Sons, Inc. v. Cullander Machinery Co., 224 Miss. 620, 80 So.
2d 757 (1955); Watts v. Adair, 211 Miss. 777, 52 So. 2d 649 (1951); General Motor Co. v.
McEachern, 150 Miss. 437, 116 So. 816 (1928) (holding the evidence insufficient to establish
reliance by the buyer).
31. 142 Miss. 536, 107 So. 382 (1926).
32. Id. at 540, 107 So. at 382.
33. Id. at 541, 107 So. at 382-83.
34. 175 Miss. 588, 167 So. 629 (1936).
35. Id.
36. 180 Miss. 6, 176 So. 717 (1937).
37. Id. at 10, 176 So. at 718 (emphasis added).
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to the conclusion that the hearse was represented and sold as a
1933 model and the phrase "as is" meant as is represented. The
court held that an express warranty as to the model had existed
and therefore had been breached by the seller.38 The rule from
Williams with regard to the warranties applicable to used goods
was strengthened and solidified in Voos v. Lawrence. 39 In an ac-
tion to recover the purchase price paid for a used outboard motor,
the court held that when the motor was secondhand there could
be no recovery unless covered by an express warranty."0
In 1951 the Mississippi Supreme Court again acknowledged
the modem trend aimed at expansion of the implied warranty doc-
trine. Refusing to follow the trend, the court reaffirmed its holding
that where there has been an executed sale and the seller is not
a manufacturer, no implied warranty exists. 1 This rule was strictly
adhered to in later cases with what appeared to be inequitable
results."2 The harshness of this rule can be seen in J. T. Fargason
and Sons, Inc. v. Cullander Machinery Co. , where the court
rejected an implied warranty claim. In this case the buyer had
relied solely on the seller's representations and assurances in pur-
chasing a pump to be used for irrigation purposes. After the pump
was installed by the seller it failed to operate as needed and
caused the loss of the plaintiff-buyer's crop. The contract provid-
ed that the seller would not be liable for any damages due to defec-
tive materials. The court denied recovery holding that there could
be no implied warranty under the terms of the contract and there
could be no implied warranty where the seller was not the
manufacturer."
In several cases the Federal courts have been asked to decide
warranty questions based upon Mississippi law before the adop-
tion of the U.C.C. Generally, these cases have held that Mississip-
pi does recognize disclaimer clauses while at the same time plac-
ing restrictions on their enforceability." s In Grey v. Hayes-
38. Id. at 12-13, 176 So. at 719.
39. 200 Miss. 1, 26 So. 2d 172 (1946).
40. Id. The court went on to hold that, "A warranty that a secondhand article is in good
condition but requires repairs to restore it to utility can mean no more than that the article can
be made usable by reasonable repair." Id. at 5-6, 26 So. 2d at 173.
41. Watts v. Adair, 211 Miss. 777, 52 So. 2d 649 (1951).
42. Stribling Bros. Machinery Co. v. Girod Co., 239 Miss. 488, 124 So. 2d 289 (1960);
J. T. Fargason and Sons, Inc. v. Cullander Machinery Co., 224 Miss. 620, 80 So. 2d 757 (1955).
43. 224 Miss. 620, 80 So. 2d 757 (1955).
44. Id.
45. Paul O'Leary Lumber Corp. v. Mill Equipment, Inc., 448 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1971);
Dry Clime Lamp Corporation v. Edwards, 389 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1968); Grey v. Hayes-Sammons
Chemical Co., 310 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1962).
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Sammons Chemical Co. "" the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cited
Stribling Bros. Machinery Co. v. The Girod Co. 47 and Industrial
Finance Corp. v. Wheat"8 for the proposition that disclaimer or
non-warranty clauses are recognized in Mississippi. The court
went further to state that, "this disclaimer must clearly and une-
quivocally describe the warranties it disclaims, and uncertainties
in the language used must be resolved against the disclaimer."' 9
The Fifth Circuit was confronted with facts similar to those in
J. T. Fargason and Sons, Inc. v. Cullander Machinery Company,
Inc. " and reached a different result in Dry Clime Lamp Corpora-
tion v. Edwards. s In Dry Clime one of the defendants, Con-
solidated Engineering, designed and installed a system for paint-
ing and baking plastic for Edwards. The court held Consolidated
liable for breach of an implied warranty of fitness when the oven
would not work, even though they were not the manufacturers,
because the plaintiff had relied on their expertise in choosing a
system to do the job. 2 In Paul Oieary Lumber Corporation v.
Mill Equipment, Inc. , the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment
against the seller of certain equipment, by holding that the
disclaimer was "skeletal" and did not mention implied warranties. "
Since the legislature adopted the U.C.C. in 1966 there have
been relatively few cases decided by the Mississippi Supreme
Court on implied warranty questions. However, one leading case
on the subject is Garner v. S & S Livestock Dealers, Inc. " This
is an important case because the court laid out the requirements
for an implied warranty of fitness under section 2-315. These are
as follows:
"(1) [T]he seller at the time of contracting had reason to know the par-
ticular purpose for which the goods are required; (2) the reliance by the
46. 310 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1962).
47. 239 Miss. 488, 124 So. 2d 289 (1960).
48. 142 Miss. 536, 107 So. 382 (1926).
49. Grey at 300. The disclaimer clause in this case read as follows: "Seller makes no war-
ranty of any kind, express or implied, concerning the use of this product. BUYER assumes all
risks for use or handling whether in accordance with directions or not." Id. at 301 (court's emphasis).
50. 224 Miss. 620, 80 So. 2d 757 (1955) (Held no implied warranty existed even though
the buyer had relied on the seller in making the purchase).
51. 389 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1968).
52. Id. Dry Clime Corp. was the manufacturer of the oven used in the system designed by
Consolidated. Both Dry Clime and Consolidated attempted to rely on the language of Dry Clime's
one year guarantee. "All previous agreements, guarantees and proposals covering equipment or
services for this subject are hereby nullified." This, however, did not exclude implied warranties,
so the court held. Id. at 593.
53. 448 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1971) (The agreement under consideration here provided, "There
are no warranties by the seller except those expressly stipulated. In no event shall the seller be
liable for consequential damages.") Id. at 538.
54. Id. at 538.
55. 248 So. 2d 783 (Miss. 1971).
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plaintiff as buyer upon the skill or judgment of the seller to select suitable
goods, and (3) the goods were unfit for the particular purpose.""
These requirements seem very similar to the reliance requirements
first discussed in P.D. Bellville Supply Co. v. Dacey57 and the
Fifth Circuit's requirements in Dry Clime Lamp Corp. v.
Edwards. " Another important case in this area is Ford Motor Co.
v. Fairley,"9 cited by the court in Massey-Ferguson on the damages
issue. The court held that there could be no breach of an implied
warranty where a car was two years old and had been driven over
26,000 miles. The court did, however, uphold the jury's finding
that the problems experienced with the car were related to those
items expressly warranted by Ford in letters notifying purchasers
of possible factory defects.6
The Federal courts have also interpreted the Mississippi ver-
sion of the U.C.C. in several cases.61 In Van Den Broeke v. Bellan-
ca Aircraft Corp. the Fifth Circuit decided a question involving
implied warranties and the validity of disclaimer
clauses. Recognizing the existing confusion in the Mississippi
U.C.C. caused by the legislature's failure to enact section 2-316,
the court stated, "The law with respect to limitation or exclusion
of warranties in Mississippi was unclear at the time of the pur-
chase .... Happily, however, we need not ... decide whether
and to what limit warranties may have been able to be
disclaimed.... "
A LOOK AT OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Not suprisingly, these types of cases are not peculiar to the
state of Mississippi. The courts of other jurisdictions have faced
the issues of implied warranties for used goods and disclaimer
56. Id. at 785. The plaintiff was not allowed to recover because he was not able to meet
the requirements. No evidence was offered to show that he had relied on the defendant in select-
ing pigs he had purchased. Id.
57. 141 Miss. 569, 106 So. 818 (1926).
58. 389 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1968).
59. 398 So. 2d 216 (1981) (On the issue of damages, the court held that, "Appellant states
the damages here are limited to those provided in the warranty, namely: the cost of repairs and
replacement of parts ... all as authorized by section 75-2-719. Such limitation presupposes,
however, that the warrantor will fulfill his warrant. . . .Having failed ...to make repairs and
replace damaged parts when it was obligated to do so, appellant cannot limit its damages to those
specifically provided in its express warranty." (citations) Id. at 219.
60. Id. at 219.
61. See Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978); R. Clin-
ton Constr. Co. v. Bryant and Reeves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
62. 576 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978). The court held that the disclaimers were ineffective because
they had not been under part of the contract.
63. Id. at 584.
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clauses with sometimes very contradictory results. Florida went
through periods of confusion before settling on a rule with regard
to implied warranties and used goods. In 1931 the Florida Supreme
Court decided McDonald v. Sanders," a case involving the sale
of a used steam shovel. The court stated as the general rule that
there is no implied warranty as to the quality or fitness of a used
article. The court did, however, find for the purchaser on an ex-
press warranty theory because the seller had assured him that the
steam shovel would be in "good working condition."6 Because
the case was actually decided on the express warranty theory, the
language addressing implied warranties may be considered dicta
and not binding for the rule that no implied warranty is involved
in the sale of secondhand goods. In Enix v. Diamond T. Sales
and Service Co." the court held that implied warranties apply
regardless of whether the goods were new or used. Although the
Florida U.C.C. was not yet in force, the court mentioned that
the implied warranty sections of the code make no distinction be-
tween new and used goods.67 In Keating v. DeArment"8 the court
seemingly changed its position, this time going back to the general
rule that there is no implied warranty of fitness or quality with
used goods espoused in McDonald v. Sanders.69 This issue was
finally put to rest in Brown v. Halr° where the court expressly
overruled any language in Keating contrary to the rule in Enix.
Brown v. Hall has been relied on in cases interpreting the U. C. C.
and is cited for the proposition that implied warranties can apply
to the sale of used goods.7 Based upon these cases, it is now a
well-settled rule in Florida that implied warranties apply to the
sales of used goods.72
In Alabama the courts have examined this problem and
reached a different conclusion. In Hodge v. Tufts7 the court upheld
the trial court's charge to the jury that the only implied warranty
that applied to a used soda fountain was that "such article or thing
64. 103 Fla. 93, 137 So. 122 (1931).
65. Id. at __, 137 So. at 125.
66. 188 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
67. Id. at 52.
68. 193 So. 2d 694, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (Liles, J., concurring). In his concur-
rence Justice Liles could not agree with the general rule regarding used goods in light of Enix
v. Diamond T. Sales and Service Co.
69. 103 Fla. 93, 137 So. 122 (1931).
70. 221 So. 2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
71. Fuquay v. Revels Motors, Inc. 389 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Knipp v.
Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Overland Bond and Investment Corp.
v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972).
72. Bert Smith Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Franldin, 400 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
73. 115 Ala. 366, 22 So. 422 (1895).
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be reasonably suitable for the purpose for which it was intended
to be used." ' The Alabama court in Kennebrew v. Southern
Automatic Electric Shock Machin. Co.7 stated a similar rule,
however, that case involved new products sold by the manufac-
turer. In 1914, in a case involving the sale of used sawmill equip-
ment, it was held that because the equipment was used it carried
no implied warranty.76 This was also the rule followed by the court
in Kilborn v. Henderson.77 In Trax, Inc. v. Tidmore,78 the court
could find no Alabama case in which the implied warranties of
the U.C.C. had been extended to used motor vehicles. It was also
held that the general rule from Kilborn that implied warranties
do not apply to used vehicles was controlling under the U.C.C.
The court limited its holding to the facts of that case, refusing
to lay down a hard and fast rule regarding used goods or vehicles
and implied warranties. 9
The rule followed in Alabama is not the majority rule.8 In
most jurisdictions interpreting the U.C.C., implied warranties do
apply or may apply to sales of used goods. Many of these cases
have been decided on language included in the official comments
to the U.C.C.8" Note 3 of the official comments to section 2-314
contains the following statement, "A contract for the sale of second-
hand goods, however, involves only such obligation as is ap-
propriate to such goods for that is their contract description."82
This statement has been used by the courts to justify extending
the implied warranty sections to the sale of used goods.83 Other
courts have supported this rule without referring to the comments,
instead basing their decision on pre-U.C.C. case law from within
their jurisdiction or cases from other jurisdictions supporting this
rule.84
74. Id. at 370, 22 So. at 423.
75. 106 Ala. 377, 17 So. 545 (1895).
76. Johnson v. Carden, 187 Ala. 142, 65 So. 813 (1914).
77. 37 Ala. App. 173, 65 So. 2d 533 (1953).
78. 331 So. 2d 275 (Ala. 1976) appeal after remand, 349 So. 2d 597 (Ala. 1977).
79. 331 So. 2d 275 at 277 (Ala. 1976).
80. Note, Sales: Extension of Implied Warranty of Merchantability to Used Goods, 46 Mo.
L. REV. 249, 250 (1981). This article contains an excellent discussion of how the rule is applied
differently in the various states.
81. Id. at 250. Some jurisdictions hold that implied warranties do apply, others hold that
they may apply.
82. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 3 (1981).
83. Overland Bond and Investment Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168
(1972). (The seller of a used car to a traveling salesman was held liable under section 2-314,
implied warranty of merchantability, and section 2-315 implied warranty of fitness); Rose v. Epley
Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 53, 215 S.E.2d 573 (1975); Natale v. Martin Volkswagen, Inc., 92 Misc.
2d 1046, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 156 (1978).
84. See O'Neil v. International Harvester Co., 40 Colo. App. 369, 575 P.2d 862 (1978);
Bert Smith Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Franklin, 900 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Centennial




In Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans" the Mississippi Supreme
Court dealt with the two issues discussed in the previous sections.
The first issue centered around the court's holding that Massey-
Ferguson had breached both its implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty and implied warranty of fitness with regard to the used
combine.8" The court very easily showed the requirements
necessary to establish a breach of those warranties, but failed to
consider an essential prerequisite factor. The court never made
the determination that these warranties actually applied to the sale
of the used combine or any other secondhand article. As men-
tioned previously, the courts of several other jurisdictions have
relied upon the official comments to the U.C.C. for support on
this issue. This means of justification is not available to our court
because the official comments were not adopted with the rest of
the U.C.C. by the Mississippi legislature. The other courts which
have applied this rule based their decisions on case law. The court
here cited no authority as support for this proposition from either
outside or inside the state. Had the case law of this state been
examined, the examination would have revealed cases such as
Williams v. McClain87 and Voos v. Lawrence.88 In each the court
held that there was no implied warranty applicable to the sale of
used goods. The only support which can be found for this lack
of a ruling on the issue by the court is discovered in the annota-
tions following sections 75-2-314 and -315 of the Mississippi Code
Annotated. Without any futher guidance from the court, it must
be assumed that at least a part of the decision is based upon cases
included in these annotations, or that the court incorporated the
annotations into its references to the sections which they follow.
The other issue had already been settled for the court, and
all that remained was to follow the law as drafted by the legislature.
This, of course, refers to the validity of the "as is" disclaimer clause
included in the sales contract. Following the 1976 amendments
contained in Chapter 385 of the General Laws of Mississippi, it
is clear that disclaimer clauses are prohibited where they attempt
to interfere with remedies available for breach of an implied war-
ranty. The omission of section 2-316 and the addition of Miss.
85. 406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981).
86. For a discussion of these different types of warranties see J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 343-60 (2d ed. 1980).
87. 180 Miss. 6, 176 So. 717 (1937).
88. 200 Miss. 1, 26 So. 2d 172 (1946).
19821
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
CODE ANN. § §75-2-719(4)" ' and 11-7-189° (Supp. 1981) compels
the decision reached by the court.
The next logical step is to examine the wisdom in an inflexi-
ble rule which will not permit disclaimers in any circumstances.
If the purpose of the legislation is to protect the consumer, why
not limit it to those situations where a consumer is involved? Is
there any reason not to permit the use of disclaimers between
businessmen or merchants? These people are presumed to be
knowledgeable and competent; therefore, the need for protection
does not exist. Some states are even passing legislation which pro-
tects certain classes of consumers, or covers certain types of pur-
chases. In a North Dakota case where a man purchased a used
tractor which would not work, he was protected by such a statute.9"
Section 51-07-07 of the North Dakota Century Code provided:
Any person purchasing any gas or oil burning tractor, gas or steam engine,
harvesting or threshing machinery, for his own use shall have a reasonable
time after delivery for the inspection and testing of the same, and if it
does not prove to be reasonably fit for the purpose which it was purchas-
ed, the purchaser may rescind the sale. Any provision in any writ-
ten order or contract of sale or other contract, which is contrary to any
provisions of this section, hereby is declared to be against public policy
and void. 2
North Dakota also allowed disclaimer or exclusion of warranty
clauses but that section did not "impair or repeal any statute
regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes
of buyers. " " By doing this, disclaimer clauses are not prohibited
in all situations, but only where the legislature feels protection
is needed.
CONCLUSION
The Mississippi Supreme Court has taken a much needed step
toward clearing away the clouds of confusion which have sur-
rounded the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code since its adop-
tion. With regard to the used goods-implied warranty issue, the
correct decision was probably made, but as to the disclaimer clause
issue the court made the only decision the law would allow. The
laws are now drafted and interpreted in such a way as to make
Mississippi one of the more liberal states in the area of consumer
89. 1976 MIss. LAWS ch. 385.
90. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-18 (Supp. 1981) reads: "There shall be no limitation of remedies
or disclaimer of liability as to any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose."
91. Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson, 240 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1976).
92. Id. at 354.
93. Id. at 355 (emphasis added). (quoting N. D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-02).
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protections." If in the future it becomes apparent that imposing
this standard on merchants is detrimental to the growth of business
and commerce, then it will be up to the legislature to make the
necessary changes. It is very important that any changes in this
area be clearly and unambiguously drafted to avoid the lack of
clarity which has just been eliminated.
Fredrick B. Feeney, II
94. In the case of Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1982),
the court held, citing Massey-Ferguson, that a purchaser of an automobile was not entitled to
the warranty protection of Miss. CODE ANN. § 72-2-315, fitness for a particular purpose. The
court stated that the purchaser was buying the car for transportation, not for any special purpose,
therefore, the seller's judgment was not needed in working the selection. However, the court did
not hold that in the case of an automobile purchase there was a warranty that the product would
be fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was purchased under Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-2-314,
citing the Massey-Ferguson case as support.
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